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CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V JONES: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BLANKET PRIMARY LAWS*
AIMEE DUDOVITZ
If a party cannot make nominations it ceases to be a party... he
who can make the nominations is the owner of the party.
E.E. Shattschneider'
Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who
share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association's
being.
L. Tribe 2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Primary elections present both courts and scholars with an unusual
legal challenge. To many, primaries appear to be a government function.
The United States Constitution grants states the power to proscribe the
"Times, Places, and Manner" of elections,3 and most states have enacted
laws that regulate the conduct of primary elections. In actuality, however, primary elections are party-driven activities. Political parties use
primaries as a vehicle for selecting a candidate to represent the party in
the general election. Primary elections also allow political parties to

. This article was accepted for publication in late 1999. Since that time,
the Su-

preme Court declared California's blanket primary law unconstitutional. See California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000). The Court has not directly addressed,
however, the many issues raised by the author herein.
1. E.E. SHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GovERNMENT (1942).
2. LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CoNsTTUTioNAL LAW 1014 (2d ed. 1988).

3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.L
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compromise and reach consensus regarding their own associational

goals.
Because primary elections play a central role in defining a party's
political purpose and ideals, state control over participation in primaries

may profoundly influence, not just a party's choice of candidates, but
also the content of a party's political speech.5 Thus, any state regulation

of participation in primaries necessarily implicates a party's First
Amendment right to freedom of association. Yet, few would question
the need for some form of government oversight. Government regulation ensures that the election process is fair and impartial, and is therefore both constitutionally permissible and desirable.
It is the tension between these two constitutional interests that is at
the forefront of the debate over the constitutionality of state-mandated
blanket primary laws.6 Washington, Alaska, Louisiana, 7 and most recently, California, 8 have all enacted so-called "blanket primary" laws. A

4. See Julia E. Guttman, Note, PrimaryElections and the Collective Right of Freedom ofAssociation, 94 YALE L.J. 117, 125-26 (1984) (discussing critical role of primaries in defining political parties). As Guttman explains, "[s]ince control over participation
in primary elections can profoundly influence the content of the compromise emerging
from the primary election, a political party's ability to define its boundaries cannot be
separated from the party's ability to determine its political ideology." Id. at 126.
5. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986) (discussing state election laws as burdening parties' right to freedom of association); TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1112 (stating that "[a]ny state law that circumscribes the discretion of a
political party infringes associational interests.").
6. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (E.D. Cal,
1997) (stating that "[i]t is the clash of these two constitutionally rooted interests that must
be resolved in this case."). Moreover, according to Professor Daniel Lowenstein, because
the relationship between the state and the parties is truly unique, their relationship is distinct from any other problem in constitutional law. See Daniel Hayes Lowenstein, AssociationalRights of Major PoliticalParties:A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV 1714,
1744 (1993) (discussing nature of conflict between states and parties).
7. Although Louisiana technically utilizes a kind of blanket primary, their system
is unlike that of the other three blanket primary states. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty,
984 F. Supp. at 1292. Under the Louisiana system, all candidates participate in a nonpartisan open primary. See id.The two candidates who receive the most votes then meet in a
runoff or general election. See id. Importantly, the two candidates who receive the most
votes are selected without regard to party affiliation. See id.
8. The California initiative that instituted the current blanket primary system was
labeled an open primary initiative. However, as Judge Levi explained in his opinion
upholding the proposition, California's system is more appropriately characterized as a
blanket primary. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92. According
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blanket primary allows all voters, regardless of their party affiliation, to

vote for any candidate for each political office.9 For example, a voter
who is registered as a Republican may vote for a Democrat for President,
a Republican for Senate, and a minor party candidate for the House of
Representatives.
Although increasing a voter's choices on election day is a laudable
goal, this Article asserts that state-mandated blanket primaries violate the
parties' First Amendment right to freedom of association and are there-

fore unconstitutional. Although the conclusion that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional is compelled by Supreme Court prece-

dent, it also raises a number of potential difficulties. First, there are
many scholars who suggest that the notion that state-mandated blanket

primaries are unconstitutional is inconsistent with the White Primary
Cases, which held that parties cannot discriminate on the basis of race in
elections, because in the election context, political parties are state actors. 10 These scholars suggest that political parties cannot be state actors
in the equal protection context of the White Primary Cases, and at the

same time, demand the First Amendment protections afforded a private
association.11

The second difficulty raised by the notion that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional is the effect of such a holding upon
government regulation of primaries more generally. This Article asserts
that Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that state-mandated
blanket primaries are unconstitutional. However, that same precedent

arguably supports the conclusion that all state-mandated primary structo Judge Levi, the blanket primary is one kind of open primary-one kind of system that
does not limit voters to the party with which they are affiliated. See id.
9. In the debate over California's blanket primary initiative, Judge Levi defined a
blanket primary as an election in which "the voter is not limited to the ballot of any single
party." CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291. In contrast, the Democratic
Party, which opposes the blanket primary, chose to explain the law as one which "forces
the parties to open their partisan primaries to unaffiliated voters and to voters with adverse political interests." Appellants Reply Brief at 1, CaliforniaDemocraticParty (No.
97-17440).
10. See Paul Carman, Comment, Cousins and La Follette: An Anomaly Createdby
a Choice Between Freedom of Association and the Right to Vote, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 666,
668-69 (1985) (discussing White Primary Cases and potential conflict with those cases
that discuss political parties' rights to freedom of association).
11. Id. (discussing potential conflict between the two lines of authority); see also
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1747-53 (discussing potential conflict between two lines of
authority).
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tures are unconstitutional. In other words, a faithful reading of Supreme
Court precedent suggests that only the parties themselves can constitutionally decide who may participate in primary elections. Thus, only a
primary system selected by the parties would pass constitutional muster.
This second difficulty provides the foundation for the third and final
issue raised by the notion that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional. If the only constitutional primary structure is one selected
or ratified by the parties themselves, courts must then confront the issue
of who speaks for the party-what voices must be heard before a court
may conclude that "the party" has spoken? For example, if the Chairperson of the statewide Democratic party decides that the Democratic party
supports a blanket primary, is it appropriate for a court to find that "the
party" supports a blanket primary? Similarly, if ninety-five percent of all
registered Democrats voted in favor of a state ballot initiative that mandates a blanket primary, does "the party" support the initiative?
This Article asserts that although the conflict with the White Primary
Cases is more apparent than real, the remaining two issues raised by the
notion that blanket primary laws are unconstitutional cannot be as easily
dismissed. Section I of this Article begins by explaining the various
primary election systems and the standard of review that applies to First
Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Section II argues
that the Supreme Court should find state-mandated blanket primary laws
unconstitutional because of the severe burden they place on a party's
right to freedom of association. Finally, Section III explores three important questions that the Supreme Court may be compelled to address if
it reaches this conclusion: (1) can a party's claim for privacy and autonomy in the context of the First Amendment be reconciled with the notion
that political parties are agents of the state in the context of the White
Primary Cases; (2) does a decision to hold state-mandated blanket primary laws unconstitutional require courts to find that all state-mandated
primary systems are unconstitutional; and (3) who must speak before a
court may conclude that "the party" has spoken? This Article concludes
by suggesting that although the first of these three questions can be answered with ease, the latter two present courts and scholars with unique
legal challenges.
II.

BACKGROUND

An understanding of the various primary systems and the standard of
review that the Supreme Court applies to state election regulations pro-
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vides the backdrop for the debate about the constitutionality of blanket
primary laws. All states have an open, closed, or blanket primary, or
some variation thereof. 12 Part A will set forth each of these three systems
and how they differ from one another. Part B will discuss the standard of
review which the Supreme Court applies in the context of First Amendment challenges to state election regulations.
A.

The Three PrimaryElection Systems

The blanket primary is only one of three basic systems of primary
elections. One of the most common systems is the open primary, which
allows registered voters to request a ballot for any party's primary on
election day, regardless of whether the voter has previously registered
with the party. 13 Under an open primary system, however, the voter is
only permitted to participate in one party's primary.1 4 For example, a
registered Democrat may decide on election day to request the primary
ballot for the Republican party. Once this voter has requested the Republican ballot, the voter will be unable to vote for a Democrat or independent candidate in any of the primary races on that day. As of 1997,
twenty-one states employ open primary systems.15
In contrast to an open primary, a closed primary system restricts participation in a party's primary to those voters who have registered as
members of the party.' Thus, under a traditional closed primary system,
only a voter who checked the "Democrat" box on his or her voter registration form is permitted to vote in the Democratic primary. Voters who
registered with other parties or declined to state a party affiliation will

12. See CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (explaining three
primary systems); see also Brian M. Castro, Note, Smothering Freedom of Association:
The Alaska Supreme Court Errs in Upholding the State's Blanket Primary Statute, 14
Alaska L. Rev. 523, 524-25 (1997) (discussing three primary systems).
13. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty,984 F. Supp. at 1291.
14. See id.
15. See id. As Judge Levi explained in a footnote in CaliforniaDemocratic Party,
some political scientists define an open primary more narrowly. See id. at 1292 n.9.
These scientists argue that an open primary includes only those systems that do not require a voter to publicly declare their party affiliation. See id. There are only 10 states
that have such a system. The other 11 states allow voters to request the ballot of any
political party, but some record of each voter's request is made, thus requiring some
statement of affiliation for the record. See id.
16. See id. at 1291.
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not be able to vote for Democratic candidates on election day.17 Fifteen
states currently have closed primary systems. 18
In addition to the fifteen closed primary states, eight other states employ a variant of the closed primary which is often referred to as a "semiclosed primary."19 Unlike the traditional closed primary, the semi-closed
system allows both registered members of the party and independent voters to participate in the party's election. 20 Thus, under a semi-closed primary, the voter who checked "decline to state" on her voter registration
form in the example above would be permitted to participate in the
Democratic party primary.
Finally, four states currently use a blanket primary system.2 1 The
blanket primary allows all voters, regardless of their party affiliation, to
vote for any candidate in any election.22 Unlike a closed primary, the
voter need not register with a party to vote in that party's primary. Yet
unlike an open primary, where a voter can only vote in one party's primary, a voter may choose to vote in the Republican party primary for
President, and the Democratic party primary for State Assembly.
Alaska, Louisiana, Washington, and most recently, California,
are the
23
only states that utilize any variation of the blanket primary.
B.

Standardof Review: The Anderson Test

The modem standard of review for First Amendment challenges to
state election regulations was first set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze,24 a
1983 Supreme Court case involving a constitutional challenge to Ohio's
early filing deadline for independent candidates. 25 Anderson was an independent candidate for President in the 1980 general election who was
denied a place on the Ohio ballot because he failed to comply with the
state's early filing deadline for independent candidates.26 Anderson and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

See id.; see also Castro, supra note 12, at 525.
24. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).

25. See id. at 782.
26. See id.
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his supporters challenged the law as an unconstitutional burden on their
First Amendment right to freedom of association. 27
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio law was unconstitutional. 28 In
so holding, the Court applied what has come to be known as the Anderson test.29 Under the Anderson test, a court must first consider the "character and magnitude" of the burden that the state law imposes on a
party's First Amendment rights.30 Second, a court must "identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule.",3 ' Finally, a court must weigh the State's
asserted interest against the burden the regulation imposes on a party's
constitutional rights.32
The Anderson balancing test is fairly malleable.3 3 Its application depends largely on how a court construes the burden that a regulation
places on a party's First Amendment rights. If the court finds that a state
law imposes a severe burden, the state regulation must survive strict
scrutiny. 34 In contrast, if the regulation imposes a burden on the party
that is
less than severe, a State's "important regulatory interest" will suf35
fice.
The Anderson Court found that Ohio's early filing deadline placed a
"particular burden" on the rights of independent voters. 36 The Court rejected the State's various attempts to justify the burden imposed by the
regulation and found that Ohio had only a "minimal interest" in the filing
deadline provision.37 Weighing the interests of the voters against the interests of the State, the Court concluded that the Ohio statute placed an

27. See id. at 783.
28. See id. at 806.
29. Castro, supra note 12, at 532 (referring to "the Anderson test").
30. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1108 (discussing the Anderson test). Tribe characterizes the Anderson test as more "open-ended" than the Court's traditional "two-tiered
equal protection analysis." Id. Tribe argues that the Anderson decision "perpetuated"
rather than settled the confusion regarding the level of scrutiny that courts should apply in
First Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Id.
34. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty 984 F. Supp. at 1294.
35. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,358 (1997).
36. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at792.
37. See id. at 806; see also Tribe, supra note 2, at 1109 (discussing Anderson).
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unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson's supporters. 38
Since 1983, courts have applied the Anderson test to decide the constitutionality of state election regulations that burden a party's First
Amendment rights.3 9 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to the Anderson test in 1997 in the case of Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party.40 In a six to three decision, the Timmons Court
used the Anderson test to uphold a Minnesota election law which prohibited candidates from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for more
than one party.4' One of the central issues of contention between the
Timmons majority and the dissent was the proper application of the Anderson test. Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the majority mistakenly concluded that the Minnesota law at issue placed an "unimportant" burden on the party's First Amendment rights.4 2 Because the Court
found that the law imposed a minimal burden, the Court applied a fairly
deferential standard of review. 43
However, in his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
have applied strict scrutiny because the law placed a severe burden on
the party's rights. 44 In addition, according to Justice Stevens, The Timmons majority failed to assure that the "State's asserted interests ...
[actually] bear some plausible relationship to the burdens it places on
political parties."45 Stevens suggested that the Timmons majority simply
accepted Minnesota's assertion that the law furthered the state's interest.4 Instead, Stevens argued that the Court should have required something more before it was willing to uphold a law that burdened a party's
right to freedom of association.47
Although the majority and the dissent disagreed on its application,
the Timmons Court reaffirmed the importance of the Anderson test in
38. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
39. See, e.g., Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369 (applying Anderson test); Tashjian, 479
U.S. at 213-14 (applying Anderson test).
40. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369-70.

41. See id.
42. See id. at 1377 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 1372.
See id. at 1378.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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First Amendment challenges to state election regulations. Accordingly,
any First Amendment challenge to a state-mandated blanket primary
must contend with the Anderson test. As Timmons illustrates, the result
of such a challenge will depend in large part on the way the Supreme
Court applies the Anderson test and the extent to which the Court scrutinizes the state's asserted interest in the law. As Section II of this Article
will demonstrate, the Anderson test suggests that the Supreme Court
should find state-mandated blanket primary laws unconstitutional.
H.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-MANDATED
BLANKET PRIMARY LAWS

As set forth above, the Supreme Court should apply the Anderson
test in evaluating the constitutionality of California's blanket primary
law. Accordingly, Part A will address the first part of the Anderson test
and assess the "character and magnitude" of a party's First Amendment
interests burdened by the regulation. a Part B will address the second part
of the Anderson test, which requires the Court to consider the state's asserted interest in a blanket primary law.49 Finally, Part C will balance the
interests of the parties against those of the state, and conclude by arguing
that under the Anderson test, state-mandated blanket primary laws unconstitutionally burden a party's right to freedom of association.
A. Burden on a Party'sFirstAmendment Right to
Freedom ofAssociation
The right to freedom of association was recognized as one of the
fundamental guarantees of the First Amendment in NAACP v. Alabama.50 In NAACP, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance an
association can play in supporting and furthering the First Amendment
activities of its members. 51 The Court expressly extended the right to
52
freedom of association to political parties in both Kusper v. Pontikes
and Cousins v. Wigoda.53 As the Court explained in Kusper:
48. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (setting forth Anderson test).

49. See id.
50. See 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).

51. See id. at 462-63.
52. See 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).

53. See 419 U.S. 477,487 (1975).
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There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with
others for the advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a
form of orderly group activity protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.... The right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.54
Moreover, as the Court noted in Cousins, "[a]ny interference with the
freedom of a party is simultaneously interference with the freedom of its
adherents. 55
Thus, freedom of association guarantees political parties the right to
associate for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs. Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in DemocraticParty v. Wisconsin, this freedom "necessarily presupposes the freedom [of the party] to identify the people
who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.' 56 Selecting a candidate to represent the party in a general election is one of the central ways that political parties advance their shared
beliefs.5 7 By facilitating the party's selection of a standard bearer, primary elections serve as a vehicle through which political parties are able
to compromise and reach consensus regarding their own associational
goals.58 Accordingly, state control over participation in primaries may
profoundly influence not just the party's choice of candidates, but also
the content of the party's political speech.59 As one author explained, "a
political party's ability to define its boundaries cannot60 be separated from
the party's ability to determine its political ideology."
The Supreme Court confirmed the importance of a party's right to
determine its own boundaries in Tashjian v. Republican Party.61 In
Tashjian, the Republican party argued that a Connecticut closed primary
law unconstitutionally infringed upon the party's right to freedom of as-

54. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 56-57.
55. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957)).
56. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel.LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981).
57. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 122-25 (discussing role of primaries in creating
party ideology).
58. See id. at 125-26.
59. See id. at 126.
60. Id. at 126.
61. 479 U.S. at 214.
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sociation by limiting the group of registered voters that the party could
invite to participate in its primary. 62 The Court agreed with the Republican Party and struck down the closed primary law. As the Court explained, such a regulation "limits the Party's associational opportunities
at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
community., 6' Furthermore, although the Tashjian Court never expressly
defined the burden that the Connecticut regulation placed on the Republican party as severe, the Court implicitly accepted
the severity of the
64
burden when it proceeded to apply strict scrutiny.
Connecticut advanced a number of interests in support of its statemandated closed primary system including administrative convenience
and savings, preventing voter raiding, preventing voter confusion, and
protecting the integrity of the two-party system.65 The Tashjian Court
found all of these asserted interests "insubstantial" and struck down the
law as unconstitutional.66
In contrast to the closed primary statute at issue in Tashjian, which
prohibited67parties from inviting unaffiliated voters to participate in their
primaries, a blanket primary requires parties to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in their primaries. 68 Nonetheless, Tashjian requires the
Court to also find a state-mandated blanket primary unconstitutional. 69

62.

Seeid. at211-13.

63.

Id. at 216.

64. See id. at 217.

65. Id. at 217-25 (discussing various interests advanced by Connecticut in support
of closed primary statute).
66. See id. at 225.
67. See id. at 211-13 (explaining statute at issue in Tashjian).
68. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1290 (explaining California's blanket primary system).

69. But see id. at 1303 (distinguishing Tashjian from blanket primary law in California). In CaliforniaDemocraticParty, Judge Levi sought to distinguish Tashjianbased

on the different political contexts in which the two laws were adopted:
Unlike Tashjian in which the Democratic Party controlled the legislature and attempted to tell the Republican Party who could vote in its
primary, and where the State's purported interest in a closed primary
was to protect the parties from disruption from without, Proposition
198 [the California blanket primary law] is a non-discriminatory
measure that was adopted by a clear majority of voters, with a convincing margin from both major parties, and which advances interests
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Like the closed primary law at issue in Tashjian, blanket primary laws
prevent a party from defining its own boundaries. Whether state law requires parties to include certain voters or prohibits parties from doing the
same, the state imposes a burden on the parties' associational rights.
Thus, state-mandated blanket primaries, like closed primaries, se-

verely burden a political party's First Amendment right to freedom of
association. As the Tashjian court explained, "[a]ny effort by the state to

substitute its judgment for that of the party on... who is and is not sufficiently allied in interest with the party to warrant inclusion in its candidate selection process ...substantially impinges on First Amendment
rights."7 ' Because of this substantial burden, the Supreme Court should
apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the constitutionality of state-mandated

blanket primary laws.
that are uniquely those of the [S]tate and its electorate as opposed to
the parties. Id.
However, Judge Levi's attempt to distinguish Tashjian is not persuasive. Assuming
Judge Levi's statement regarding the support that Proposition 198 received from voters of
both major political parties is correct, Levi is essentially arguing that a blanket primary
system is permissible as long as the parties themselves approve of the system. In other
words, the difference between Tashjian and the situation in CaliforniaDemocraticParty
is that in the former, the statute at issue defined the Republican party's boundariesfor the
party, while in the latter, the parties (i.e. the voters affiliated with each party) defined
their own boundaries.
Here, Judge Levi is equating exit polls indicating support for the proposition by voters of both major parties with the notion that the parties themselves supported the proposition, and thus defined their own boundaries. However, as Levi stated earlier in his
opinion, one cannot equate the results of exit polls with a formal decision by a political
party. See id. at 1294 n.16. And, if poll results cannot replace formal party decisions, then
it is not clear whether the political context of Tashjian was truly that different from the
political context of CaliforniaDemocraticParty.
70. In CaliforniaDemocratic Party, California argued for a narrower reading of
Tashjian. California argued that Tashjian stands for the proposition that the state cannot
limit who a party may include in their primary. Thus, a blanket primary law, which requires parties to open their primaries to additional voters, would not be unconstitutional
under Tashjian. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 22-23, California Democratic
Party (No. CIV.S-96-02038 DFL). At best, this is a strained reading of Supreme Court
precedent. In order to conclude that Tashjian'sholding was so limited, one must overlook
the many passages in Tashjian regarding the importance of a party's ability to determine
its own boundaries. Such language suggests a more expansive interpretation of Tashjlian.
71. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added). This quote was included in the
Republican Party's Post-Trial Brief appealing the District Court's ruling in California
Democratic Party. See Post-Trial Brief at 7, CaliforniaDemocratic Party (No. CIV-S96-2038 DFL).
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Yet the fact that a state election regulation places a severe burden on
a party's First Amendment rights is not the end of the inquiry. Under the
Anderson test, the Court must next examine the state's asserted interest
in regulating primaries.72
B. Possible State Justificationsfor Blanket PrimaryLaws
California offered the following four essential state interests 73 in
support of its newly adopted blanket primary law: (1) increasing competition among the candidates; (2) producing elected officials who best represent the electorate; (3) increasing voter participation by opening the
candidate selection process to include both independent and minor party
voters; and (4) preserving the integrity of the electoral process. 74 Each of
these interests will be examined in turn.
1. Increasing Competition Among the Candidates
One argument California advanced in defense of its blanket primary
law was that the voting system "encourages healthy competition." 75 The
premise of this argument is that by giving voters greater choice among
candidates in a primary election, the candidates will be forced to compete
more aggressively for each available vote. Proponents of this argument
suggest that this increased competition will lead to greater and more substantial political debates, thereby fostering the democratic process.76

72. See Anderson 460 U.S. at 789.
73. California actually advanced more than four interests in support of the blanket
primary law, but Judge Levi found that most of California's interest could be reduced to
the assertion that blanket primaries "enhanceol the democratic nature of the election process and representativeness of elected officials." California Democratic Party, 984 F.
Supp. at 1301. Judge Levi's opinion focused on the following arguments asserted by
California: (1) the contention that blanket primaries will increase voter participation by
opening the candidate selection process to minor party and independent voters; (2) the
notion that blanket primaries will produce officials who best represent the electorate; and
(3) the idea that blanket primaries will ultimately increase voter participation in general.
See id. at 1301.

74. Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 49, California Democratic Party (No.
CIV. S-96-02038 DFL).
75.
76.

Id.
See id.

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44

This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, a number of cases
addressing the constitutionality of election regulations have considered
and rejected the theory that the First Amendment rights of some should
be limited for the benefit of the democratic process. For example, in
Buckley v. Valeo,77 the Supreme Court struck down a federal law restricting campaign contributions and expenditures. According to Buckley, the notion that the government may restrict the First Amendment
rights of one segment of the population in order to increase the relative
voice of others is "wholly foreign to the First Amendment.""8 Yet California's attempt to justify a blanket primary law on the grounds that it
increases competition is vulnerable to the same analysis-California is
essentially arguing that the state should restrict the First Amendment
rights of political parties in order to obtain the systemic benefits that flow
from increased competition among the candidates.7 9
The notion that increased competition is a compelling state interest
was also rejected in Bates v. Jones,80 a district court case which addressed the constitutionality of term limits for state elected officials. According to the Bates court, increased competition is not a compelling
state interest because it is not clear that it will produce a better democracy:
[as] used by the State, the term "electoral competition" refers to
increasing the number of candidates running for office and decreasing the margins by which candidates win elections. Neither
of these interests, by themselves, are compelling interests because it is not self-evident that they have a desirable effect on
government. 1
In other words, even if blanket primary laws do increase competition,
this alone is not a compelling state interest because it is not clear that
candidate competition benefits the state.
Thus, courts have considered and rejected the notion that increased
competition is a compelling state interest. But the "increased competi77. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (rejecting argument that term limits level
playing field as compelling state interest).
79. This author expresses no opinion about the merits of the Buckley decision.
80. 958 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
81. Id. at 1468.
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tion" argument also fails for a second reason. Even assuming that increased competition is a compelling state interest, California must still
demonstrate a nexus between the blanket primary system and increased
competition. The mere assertion that increased competition will result
from the institution of a blanket primary is not sufficient in light of the
severe burden that the system places on a party's First Amendment
rights. In the absence of empirical evidence of a nexus, the Supreme
Court should reject the argument that blanket primaries increase competition among candidates.
2.

Producing Elected Officials Who Best Represent the Electorate

Proponents of state-mandated blanket primaries also contend that a
blanket primary system will lead to the election of more centrist officials
who are more representative of their districts. For example, California
asserts that officials elected via a blanket primary system "stand closer to
the median" in their districts than officials elected through a closed primary system.8 2 California further asserts that a blanket primary system
will result in elected officials who more accurately reflect the political
views of all of the voters they represent.83
Like the argument that blanket primaries increase competition, this
argument too is flawed. The notion that the state has an interest in supporting the election of candidates who stand closer to the median is tantamount to asserting that the state has an interest in supporting the election of candidates with certain ideologies. A state clearly does not have a
legitimate, let alone compelling, interest in promoting the election of
more moderate candidates. Favoring any election system because of the
content or viewpoint of the speech that may result84from those officials
who are elected is not a proper government interest.
Supporters of this viewpoint often attempt to cloak this argument in
language which suggests that the state is merely supporting a system that
82. Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 51, CaliforniaDemocraticParty (No. 9717440); see also Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton, PrimaryElection Systems
and Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304, 304 (1998) (arguing that open primary
systems lead to election of more moderate candidates).
83. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 5 1, CaliforniaDemocraticParty (No.
97-17440).
84. Cf.R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (discussing
concern that government's content discrimination may drive certain viewpoints from the
"marketplace" of ideas).
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ensures that the "election winner will represent a majority of the community. ' ,85 But this argument confuses the function of the primary election with the function of the general election. It is the candidate who
wins the general election that is charged with the responsibility of representing the district as a whole. The primary election winner is charged
only with the responsibility of representing the ideals and beliefs of his
or her party.86
3. Increasing Participation by Opening the Primary Process to Independent and Minor Party Voters
Perhaps the most persuasive justification for state-mandated blanket
primaries is the notion that the system will further democratize elections
by opening the primary process to both minor party and independent voters. Proponents argue that these two growing groups are effectively disenfranchised in a closed primary system.87 Especially in so-called "safe
districts," in which one party is clearly dominant, many think that independent and minor party voters would be more involved and better represented through a blanket primary system.88
For example, in a Democratic safe district where Democrats represent at least sixty percent of registered voters, the Democratic candidate
will almost always win the general election. In such districts, the critical
election becomes the primary rather than the general. 89 Therefore, many

85.

CaliforniaDemocraticParty,984 F. Supp. at 1303.

86. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 125-26 (discussing importance of primary elections in formation of political parties' ideologies).
87.

See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1301-02 (discussing argu-

ment that blanket primary opens primary process to include "disenfranchised" voters);
Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 53, CaliforniaDemocratic Party (No. 97-17440)
(arguing that California's closed primary disenfranchises one-quarter million minor party
and independent voters).
88.

See CaliforniaDemocraticParty,984 F. Supp. at 1302 (defining safe districts

and discussing notion that minor party voters in safe districts have little voice in elections); see also Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 53, California Democratic Party

(No. 97-17440) (explaining safe districts and arguing that disenfranchised voters in safe
districts have "no say in the overall election"). According to California's Brief to the
Ninth Circuit in CaliforniaDemocratic Party, a majority of congressional, state senate,
and assembly districts in California are "safe" for one major party or the other. See id.
89.

See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1302 (explaining impact of

general election in safe districts).

2000]

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V JONES

argue that voters who are unable to participate in the Democratic primary
are effectively disenfranchised. 90
This argument is not without force. Perhaps if states adopt a blanket
primary system, voter participation in primary elections would increase
as a result of the participation of minor party and independent voters so called "unaffiliated voters." Moreover, a blanket primary would
clearly allow unaffiliated voters to participate in and influence the outcome of the major party primaries in safe districts.
Nonetheless, this argument is not persuasive. Political parties have a
constitutional right to freedom of association, a right that includes the
ability of each party to define its own boundaries and select its own
nominees. 91 As long as the state provides unaffiliated voters with alternative methods of nominating general election candidates, unaffiliated
voters do not have a constitutional right to participate in other parties'
primary elections. 92 As one author explained, "[t]he party member's constitutional right takes precedence over unaffiliated voters' nonconstitutional interest in primary outcomes. 93
In addition, even assuming that states have an interest in increasing
the influence of unaffiliated voters more generally, instituting a blanket
primary is not the least restrictive means of accomplishing this goal. For
example, states could relax the requirements for obtaining access to the
general election ballot so that any candidate who can demonstrate some
minimal level of support could appear on the general election ballot.94
This would increase the likelihood that unaffiliated voters would find a
candidate in the general election who represents their political beliefs.
Finally, to the extent that the state has an interest in increasing voter
participation in general, there are more effective and more narrowly tailored means of doing so than instituting a blanket primary. States that do
not currently have "same day registration" could implement such a system. 95 In addition, every state could move election day to Sunday, make

90.
91.

See id.
See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at215.

92. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 133-34 n.10 (discussing constitutional rights of
unaffiliated voters).
93. Id. at 133.
94. See id. at 134.

95. It is interesting to note that under a same day registration system, the differences between the three primary systems are arguably de minimus. Because voters can
decide the day of the election which party they chose to affiliate with and thus which
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election day a holiday, or allow polls to remain open for two or three
days.96 All of these changes would likely increase voter turnout without
infringing the constitutional rights of political parties.
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Electoral Process
The final argument advanced in support of blanket primary laws is
the notion that blanket primaries somehow strengthen the integrity of the
electoral process. 97 Supporters maintain that a blanket primary is more
likely than a closed primary to lead the public to believe that primary
elections are an open and fair process. 98 However, this argument is also
flawed. Rather than preserving the integrity of elections, a blanket primary may actually diminish the integrity of the electoral process. Preserving the integrity of the electoral process presumably includes insuring that voters have confidence in the state's election system. However,
as a result of a conflict with the Republican and Democratic National
Parties' rules, California's decision to adopt a blanket primary may shake
this confidence.
Both the Democratic and Republican parties have national party
rules that forbid non-party members from participating in the selection of
each party's national convention delegates.99 The delegates officially
nominate and select each party's nominee at the national nominating

ballot to request at the polls, there is little difference between an open primary and a
closed primary in a state that allows same day registration.
96. Many of these alternatives were suggested by the California Republican Party
in their Post-Trial Brief in CaliforniaDemocratic Party. See Post-Trial Brief at 27-28,
CaliforniaDemocraticParty (No. CIV. S-96-2038 DFL).

97. Although California did not explicitly utilize this justification in defending its
blanket primary system, all of the interests advanced by the state relate to the integrity of
the electoral process as a whole.
98. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 4, at 131-32 (discussing notion that preserving
integrity of general elections justifies state decision to adopt one primary system as opposed to another).
99. See Ballot Material for Proposition 3-November 3, 1998 General Election
(discussing parties' rules preventing delegates selected by unaffiliated voters from being
seated); Mark Z. Barabak, Seeking a PresidentialLoophole in Blanket PrimaryLaw, L.A.

TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at AlO (discussing national party rules and California's various
attempts to ensure that California's votes count in presidential primary); see also La Follette, 450 U.S. at 109 (explaining National Democratic Party rules and holding that parties have constitutional right to refuse to seat delegates selected by unaffiliated voters).
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convention.100 Thus, the National Republican Party will not permit nonRepublicans to participate in selecting the Republican national convention delegates, and the Democratic National Party will not permit nonDemocrats to participate in selecting the Democratic national convention
delegates. Yet under a blanket primary system, that is precisely what
occurs - state law requires both major parties to permit unaffiliated voters to participate in their parties' presidential primary elections. 10 1 The
Supreme Court has held that the national parties have the right to refuse
to seat delegates from a state that permits nonaffiliates to vote in the parties' presidential primaries.102 For example, the National Democratic
Party has the constitutional right to refuse to seat the delegates elected by
California voters in the March 7, 2000 presidential primary.
Soon after California's blanket primary law was adopted, state officials realized that the new law could prevent California voters from participating in selecting the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees. Accordingly, lawmakers quickly explored various means of ensuring that the national parties would accept California's votes, while at
the same time preserving the new blanket primary law approved by the
voters. 1°4
One solution to the conflict is to allow the blanket primary to proceed, but to select the actual delegates through a party caucus rather than
through the election. 0 5 This solution was adopted by the State of Washington, one of the three other states with a state-mandated blanket pri100. For example, by selecting Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential primary, voters actually selected a slate of delegates pledged to vote for Clinton at the National
Democratic Convention. Each candidate on the presidential primary ballot has a unique
list of pledged delegates. The pledged delegation that receives the most votes goes to the
nominating convention on behalf of the state. Together with the pledged delegations from
other states, the delegates will select the party's presidential nominee. See Argument in
Favor of Proposition 3-November 3, 1998 General Election (explaining presidential
nominating process).
101. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (explaining blanket primary system).
102. See LaFollette Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 127 (holding that National
Democratic Party need not seat Wisconsin delegates selected through open primary).
103. See Dave F. Pike, High Court to Rule on State's Open Primaries,L.A. DAILY
J., Jan. 24, 2000 at 1.
104. See id.
105. See generally John Marelius, Open PrimaryMay Stir State Problem in 2000
at http://vww.uniontrib.com ( Feb. 8, 1999) (discussing party caucuses as an alternative
method of selecting delegates).
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mary.1° 6 In Washington State, for the year 2000 presidential primary,
voters will go to the polls and vote in a blanket primary election. However, the election will be little more than a "beauty contest" because the
results of the election will not lead to the selection of delegates. 10 7 Instead, each party will hold a caucus to select delegates to send to its respective national party convention. The party caucuses rather than the
voters will decide which Democratic and Republican presidential candidates will receive Washington State's electoral votes in the year 2000
presidential primary.
The use of party caucuses to resolve the conflict between blanket
primaries and the major parties' national rules may lead many voters to
question the integrity of the electoral process. Under the Washington
State system, voters participate in an election that is arguably meaningless, while only a small percentage of the state's population is able to
participate in the more meaningful party caucuses. Because the caucus
rather than the electorate decides which nominee will receive Washington State's votes, the average voter will not have any voice in selecting
the major parties' presidential nominees.
California has adopted a different resolution to this conflict. The
California Legislature adopted a law that brings the state into compliance
with the national parties' rules in time for the year 2000 primary! 05 The
law allows California to conduct a blanket primary and provide the national parties with vote tabulations that do not include the votes of nonafflliates. 10 9 Specifically, the Legislature amended the blanket primary law
to permit two tallies of the votes for President - one for the blanket
primary beauty contest and a second for the parties' delegate selection
process." 0 For this second tabulation, computers will count only registered Democrats' votes for the Democratic candidates and registered Re-

106. See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Washington and State of Alaska at 1,
CaliforniaDemocraticParty (No. 97-17440).
107. See John Marelius, Open Primary May Stir State Problem in 2000 at
http://www.uniontrib.com, (Feb. 8, 1999) (referring to such elections as "beauty contests").
108. See Pike, supra note 103, at I (discussing amendment to California's blanket
primary initiative); see also Mark Z. Barabak, Seeking a PresidentialLoophole in Blanket
PrimaryLaw, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1998, at A10.
109. See Dave F. Pike, High Court to Rule on State's Open Primaries,L.A. DAILY
J., Jan. 24, 2000 (discussing amendment to California's blanket primary initiative).
110. See id.
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publicans' votes for the Republican candidates."' Although the state will
presumably announce the results of both tabulations, the parties are free
to use the second tally at their national conventions. 2
Under this system, the integrity of the electoral process still suffers.
Presumably California will have to explain to voters that because they
adopted a blanket primary system, they will be permitted to vote in a
non-binding beauty contest' 1 3 California will also have to explain to voters that although they are allowed to vote for any candidate for President,
if they chose to vote outside their party, their vote will not be counted in
the second delegate selection tally. As a result of this system, voters may
not understand how to effectively cast their votes in the presidential primary, and thus may question the fairness of the electoral process.
Thus, rather than increasing the integrity of elections, a blanket primary system, in conjunction with the long-standing rules of both of the
major parties, may seriously jeopardize the integrity of the electoral process. Accordingly, preserving the integrity of elections and the electoral
process cannot serve as a compelling state interest that justifies the use of
a state-mandated blanket primary.
C.

Conclusion:State-MandatedBlanket Primaries
Are Unconstitutional

Under the Anderson test, the Supreme Court should find statemandated blanket primaries unconstitutional. The blanket primary interferes with a political party's ability to define its own boundaries and select its own nominees. Moreover, the process of selecting a nominee
may profoundly affect not just a party's choice of candidates, but also the
content of the party's political speech. The blanket primary severely
burdens a party's First Amendment right to freedom of association as
defined by the Supreme Court in Tashjian.
Furthermore, this severe burden cannot be supported by a compelling
state interest. None of the interests advanced by California truly justifies
this burden. First, courts have rejected the notion that increasing competition among candidates can serve as a compelling state interest. Second,
even if blanket primaries do lead to more moderate elected officials,
111.

See S.B. 28, 1999 Cal. Sess., locatedat http:flwww.sen.ca.gov.

112. See id.
113.

See John Marelius, Open Primary May Stir State Problem in 2000 at

http://www.uniontrib.com (Feb. 8, 1999) (discussing proposed bills).
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states do not have a legitimate, let alone compelling, state interest in
promoting the election of candidates with certain ideologies. Third, the
constitutional rights of political parties take precedence over the nonconstitutional rights of unaffiliated voters to participate in party primaries. Finally, rather than preserving the integrity of elections, blanket
primaries may actually diminish their integrity.
The final prong of the Anderson test requires the Supreme Court to
weigh the burden on a party's First Amendment rights against California's asserted justifications. On balance, the state's asserted governmental interests cannot justify the severe burden blanket primary laws
impose on a party's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, under existing Supreme Court precedent, the Supreme Court should find California's blanket primary law unconstitutional.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CONCLUSION
THAT STATE-MANDATED BLANKET PRIMARIES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that statemandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional, this holding also raises
a number of questions that the Supreme Court may be reluctant to address. First, some scholars have suggested that such a holding would be
inconsistent with the White Primary Cases, which held that parties cannot discriminate on the basis of race in elections because in the election
context, political parties are agents of the state.11 4 Part A of this section
will explore the potential conflict between striking down blanket primary
laws due to their impact on parties as private associations and the notion
that parties are state actors in the context of the White Primary Cases.
Second, although Supreme Court precedent suggests that statemandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional, that precedent arguably
requires the Court to find that all state-mandated primary systems are
unconstitutional. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, only a primary system selected by the parties would pass constitutional muster.
Part B will examine some of the difficulties associated with this conclusion.

114. See, e.g., Carman, supra note 10, at 668-69 (discussing White Primary Cases
and potential conflict between this line of cases and those cases that discuss political
parties' rights to freedom of association); see also Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1747-53
(discussing potential conflict between two lines of authority).
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Finally, Part C will explore the related question of who must speak
before a court can conclude that "the party" has spoken. If the only constitutional primary system is one selected by the parties, then courts may
need to confront the difficult issue of who speaks on behalf of a party.
A. Consistency with the White PrimaryCases
The premise underlying the idea that political parties have First
Amendment associational rights is that political parties are private associations.1 5 Indeed, political parties do exhibit many of the attributes of a
typical private association. Yet as Laurence Tribe explains, political
parties also "seem imbued with a quasi-governmental character."' 1 6 It is
this hybrid nature of political parties that has led some scholars to question whether the parties' claim for privacy and autonomy can be reconciled with the notion that political parties can also be state actors.
The leading line of authority holding that parties may be state actors
is the so-called "White Primary Cases." In these cases, the Supreme
Court invalidated various attempts by the Democratic party to disenfranchise African-Americans. 17 For example, the Court struck down Democratic party rules that prohibited African-Americans from participating in
pre-primary party meetings." 8 The Supreme Court held that these rules
violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 19 However, the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments do not regulate private conduct;
they only proscribe government behavior.120 Thus, in order to hold that
political parties cannot discriminate on the basis
of race, the Court had to
12 1
find that the party's actions were state actions.

115.

See

TRIBE,

supra note 2, at 1118 (discussing political parties and state action

doctrine).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1118-19 (discussing White Primary Cases).
118. See generally Terry v. Adams, 344 U.S. 883 (1952); see also Tribe, supra
note 2, at 1119 (discussing White Primary Cases).
119. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1118-19 (discussing political parties and state action doctrine).
120. See id. at 1118 (discussing political parties and state action doctrine).
121. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1118-20 (discussing state action doctrine and
White Primary Cases). This is not to suggest that the Court found state action because it
wanted to hold the party's actions unconstitutional, but rather that state action is a necessary precondition to such a holding. Still, some authors suggest that state action is just a
post hoe label the Court applies to justify striking down regulations in certain situations.
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Although the Supreme Court concluded that the Democratic party's
actions were equivalent to actions of the state, the Court failed to articulate the legal basis for finding state action in this context. Scholars such
as Tribe argue that the Court found state action in the White Primary
Cases because the state affords preferential ballot access in the general
election to the winner of the Democratic party primary. 22 Under this
view, a party's action is a state action "when the state incorporates the
party's behavior by automatically
placing the primary winners on the
23
ballot.',
election
general
Regardless of the rationale, in striking down the Democratic party
rules at issue in the White Primary Cases, the Supreme Court held that in
certain circumstances, "activities of political parties are reviewable as
actions of the state.' 124 However, in order to claim the protections of the
First Amendment and enjoy the right to freedom of association, political
parties must be private associations, not government actors.' Thus,
some scholars suggest that by striking down blanket primary laws as a
violation of the parties' right to freedom of association, the Supreme
Court may threaten the legal underpinnings of the White Primary
Cases. 26 As one author explains:
Thus, by declaring parties to be "public," the White Primary
Cases not only prohibited [the parties] from depriving racial minorities of the right to vote but also seemed to deprive the parties
of the protections of the Bill of Rights. If instead parties were
declared to be "private," they would enjoy constitutional rights,

See Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1753 (describing state action as a post hoc label rather
than an "a priori analytic device").
122. See Tribe, supra note 2, at 1121 (explaining that state incorporates behavior

of parties into general election ballot is most persuasive description of state action doctrine in election context). Although Tribe supports this explanation of the state action
doctrine as applied to political parties, the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly endorse
this theory. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 119 n.10 (discussing state action and White

Primary Cases).
123.

Guttman, supra note 4, at 119 n.10
TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1120.
125. See id.
126. See Carman, supra note 10, at 668-69 (discussing potential conflict between
White Primary Cases and notion that parties have rights to freedom of association);
Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1748-49 (discussing potential conflict between White Primary Cases and notion that parties have rights to freedom of association).

124.
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but the
foundation for the White Primary Cases would be under27
cut.

1

Under this view, the notion that state-mandated blanket primary laws are
unconstitutional undercuts the legal foundation for the White Primary
Cases.
This conflict, however, is more apparent than real. The equal protection context of the White Primary Cases is distinguishable from the
First Amendment context of a blanket primary law. In the context of
equal protection, discrimination on the basis of race is different than discriminating between affiliated and non-affiliated members of a political
party. Excluding voters from a primary election on the basis of race
amounts to invidious discrimination and is subject to strict scrutiny. 128 In
contrast, a law that discriminates against non-affiliates is not invidious
and would only be subject to rational basis review because voters can
change their party affiliations any time they please. 129 Thus, it is consistent with constitutional doctrine that a court would allow a party to "discriminate" against voters on the basis of affiliation while condemning
discrimination on the basis of race.
It is important to note, however, that there are certain contexts in
which the state cannot discriminate against individuals based on party
affiliation. 130 For example, the state cannot consider political beliefs or
party affiliation when making hiring, firing, or promotional decisions
regarding its employees. 13' However, a court's decision to strike down a
blanket primary law does not raise such problems. The state can constitutionally deny non-affiliates the right to vote in a party primary as long
as the state provides non-affiliates with alternative avenues for placing a
candidate on the general election ballot. 132 In other words, the state does
not abridge a voter's constitutional right to vote by allowing the parties
to limit participation in their respective primaries to only affiliates, pro-

127. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1748-49.
128. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 137 nn.9 & 13 (distinguishing White Primary

Cases).
129. See id.
130. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990).
131. See id.
132. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 137 n.10 (discussing state action and White
Primary Cases).
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vided every voter has an opportunity
to participate in placing candidates
33
on the general election ballot.1
Thus, the White Primary Cases can be reconciled with the conclusion
that state-mandated blanket primary laws are unconstitutional. Discrimination on the basis of race is suspect, while discrimination on the basis of
party affiliation is not.134 Moreover, the Supreme Court may strike down
a party policy permitting racial discrimination, and at the same time, uphold a party rule that permits discrimination on the basis of party affiliation. As long as the state provides voters with an alternative avenue for
placing candidates on the general election ballot, prohibiting nonaffiliates from voting in a party's primary does not violate the nonaffiliates' constitutional rights.
B.

Must Courts FindAll State-MandatedPrimary
Election Systems Unconstitutional

Although the first issue raised by the notion that state-mandated
blanket primaries are unconstitutional is easily resolved, this second issue is more problematic. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's ruling in Tashjian supports the conclusion that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional. However, Tashjian arguably supports the
notion that all state-mandated primaries are unconstitutional. If this is in
fact the case, only a primary system selected by the parties would pass
constitutional scrutiny.
In Tashjian, the Republican party challenged a Connecticut closed
primary law that forbid the party from opening its candidate selection
process to non-affiliates. 136 In striking down the law, the Supreme Court
issued a broad statement regarding the right of political parties to determine their own boundaries: "the freedom to join together in furtherance
of common political beliefs 'necessarily presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association."" 137 The Court ultimately held that Connecticut's closed primary law infringed the Republican party's right to freedom of association by preventing the party from
133.

See id.

134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211-12 (discussing closed primary statute at issue
in Tashjian).

137. Id. at 214.
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determining13 "with whom they will associate, [and] whose support they

will seek.,

1

It is this broad language in Tashjian that requires the Supreme Court
to find state-mandated blanket primaries unconstitutional. Although a
closed primary limits who may participate in a party primary and a blanket primary requires parties to allow non-affiliates to participate, the constitutional right at issue is the same-the right of a political party to determine its own boundaries. Under Tashjian, a party should have the
right to decide not to include non-affiliates, just as it has the right to invite non-affiliates to participate in its primary.
But such a strict reading of Tashjian would presumably mean that all
state-mandated primary systems are unconstitutional. If political parties
have the absolute right to define their own boundaries, then regardless of
whether the state employs an open, closed, or blanket primary, if a party
prefers one of the other tvo alternatives, it can challenge the current
system on First Amendment grounds. For example, suppose California's
blanket primary law is struck down as unconstitutional and California
maintains its previous closed primary system. Next year, the California
Republican Party, like the Connecticut Republican Party, may decide to
open its primary election to unaffiliated voters. In this case, the Republican party could challenge California's closed primary statute just as it is
currently challenging California's blanket primary statute.
In his decision upholding California's blanket primary law, Judge
Levi recognized this potential reading of Tashjian.139 As Judge Levi explained, if political parties had the absolute right to define their own
boundaries, "then open primaries would also be unconstitutional upon
any party's objection: an open primary, every bit as much as a blanket
primary, permits voters who are not registered in a party to vote in that
party's primary." 140 Levi recognized that the issue is not the primary
election system a state chooses, but rather, whether the parties themselves would select the same system.
Moreover, it is possible that the various political parties may not select the same primary system. If the Republican party invites unaffiliated
voters to participate in its primary, while the Democratic party exercises
138. Id.
139. See CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 984 F. Supp. at 1294-95 (discussing logical
conclusion of notion that political parties have absolute right to determine their own
boundaries).
140. Id.
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its right to exclude non-affiliates, does the Constitution require the state
to accommodate both parties' preferences? Under Tashjian, the answer is
not clear.
Thus, Tashjian leaves both courts and scholars in an difficult place.
Tashjian suggests that state-mandated blanket primaries are unconstitutional. However, it also suggests that all state-mandated primary systems
are unconstitutional. It is not clear whether states will be able to modify
their primary systems to accommodate the changing whims of the various parties, or even whether the states should be constitutionally required
to do so. If the logical conclusion of Tashjian results in an unworkable
model, perhaps the Tashjian framework for analyzing the relationship
between the state and political parties should be reconsidered.
C.

Who Speaks for "The Party"?

The final question prompted by the conclusion that blanket primary
laws are unconstitutional involves the difficult question of who is
authorized to speak on behalf of a given political party. If the only constitutional primary election system is one selected by the parties, courts
must be able to determine when a party supports a particular voting system. For example, if the California Democratic State Central Committee
decides that the Democratic party supports a blanket primary, is it appropriate for a court to find that "the party" supports such a system? Similarly, if a majority of registered Democrats supported Proposition 198,
the initiative that instituted a blanket primary system in California, could
a court confidently conclude that "the party" has spoken? Although few,
if any, court decisions have addressed these questions to date, courts and
scholars may soon have to struggle to provide answers.
Judge Levi's opinion in CaliforniaDemocratic Party is one of the
few opinions to have recognized and addressed some of the difficulties in
determining who speaks for a party. In California Democratic Party,
Judge Levi upheld the California blanket primary initiative as constitutional in the face of challenges by both major parties and two minor parties.141 Levi's opinion was later affirmed and adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 142

141. See id. at 1303.
142. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999).
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In CaliforniaDemocratic Party, California argued that because exit
polls demonstrated that a majority of both Democrats and Republicans
favored the initiative, "the parties" supported the blanket primary.' 43 According to the State, these polls proved that the rank-and-file members of
both parties approved of a blanket primary system, and the court should
defer to the interests of the members over the interests of Democratic and
Republican party leaders. 144 Thus, the State argued that the court should
recognize the rank-and-file members, rather than the leadership, as the
voice of a party.
Judge Levi did not agree, however. In a lengthy footnote Levi dismissed the State's argument.1 45 According to Levi, there are three reasons why California's argument is flawed. 46 Levi's first two reasons are
essentially procedural. First, the Los Angeles Times poll at issue did not
report the votes of minor party candidates. 47 Thus, even if California's
argument was theoretically correct, it would not affect the minor parties'
complaint regarding the blanket primary initiative because there is no
evidence as to the views of their rank-and-file members. Second, Levi
questioned California's suggestion that exit polls could be used in place
other context do we
of actual vote tabulations. 148 As Levi stated, "In no
49
accept the results of polling for the act of voting."'
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Levi dismissed the argument
on its merits-he disagreed with California's contention that rank-andfile members are empowered to speak for a party. 150 As Judge Levi
stated:

143. See Appellee's and Intervenor's Brief at 10-16, CaliforniaDemocratic Party,
984 F.Supp 1288 (E.D. Cal 1997) (No. CIV. S-96-2038 DFL) (arguing that Proposition
198 presents no First Amendment issue because, according to exit polls, rank-and-file
Democrats and Republicans supported initiative).
144. See id. According to the Los Angeles Times exit poll, 61% of Democrats supported Proposition 198, as did 57% of Republicans. See id. at 10.
145. See California Democratic Party, 984 F. Supp. at 1294 n.16 (discussing
State's argument that parties supported proposition because their rank-and-file membership supported proposition).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.

149.

Id.

150. See id.
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Finally, the parties have certain procedures for the modification
of their rules. These procedures require deliberation and decisionmaking by the parties' respective central committees. Other
deliberative bodies have similar procedural rules. Such rules
may affect the nature of debate-indeed, may cause there to be
debate-and may affect the outcome of the decision. We would
not accept a poll of legislators as the equivalent of a legislative
vote. For much the same reason, a poll of voters is not the
equivalent of a decision by a party according to the procedural
rules of the party. The court therefore rejects the argument that
the "parties," as defined by the electorate, have agreed to Proposition 198 .... 1"1
Thus, Judge Levi categorically rejected California's argument that the
rank-and-file may speak for the party. According to Levi, in order for a
court to conclude that "the party" has spoken, the party and its leadership
must arrive at a decision by following the party's internal decisionmaking procedures.
Perhaps other courts will follow Judge Levi's lead and conclude that
the rank-and-file cannot speak for the party outside of the party's own
governance structure. Furthermore, although Levi's view as expressed in
California Democratic Party is arguably dicta, courts may soon be
forced to confront this issue more directly. As long as Tashjian requires
courts to evaluate First Amendment challenges to state election regulations by focusing on the importance a party's ability to define its own
boundaries, courts will continue to confront the difficult issue of who
speaks for the party.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court should find
California's blanket primary law unconstitutional. Yet this conclusion
leaves courts and scholars in an unsettling place, for it raises a number of
seemingly difficult issues. Although the legal underpinnings of the
White Primary Cases are not threatened by the notion that statemandated blanket primary laws are unconstitutional, the remaining two
issues discussed in this Article cannot be so easily resolved. To date, the
Supreme Court has not been forced to squarely address the question of
151.

Id.
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whether political parties have the First Amendment right to select their
own primary election system, or the question of who is authorized to
speak for a party. Perhaps when faced with these questions, the Court
will be forced to rethink the Tashjian model and redefine the unique and
evolving relationship between the state and political parties.

